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ZONE DEFENSE: HOW ZONING LAWS WON IN
TRI-COUNTY LANDFILL, INC. V. COMMONWEALTH
I. INTRODUCTION
In Tri-County Landfill, Inc. v. Commonwealth,1 the Pennsylvania
Environmental Hearing Board (the Board) faced a motion for sum-
mary judgment, but much more was at stake.2  The case posed the
question of whether local zoning ordinances fell within the protec-
tions that the Pennsylvania Constitution afforded.3  Based on the
outcome of that issue, the Board then had to determine what obli-
gations its decision triggered.4
In its decision to deny the motion for summary judgment, the
Board established that local zoning ordinances were within the pro-
tections established under Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion (Section 27).5  The significance of this decision, however, is
not limited to solidifying constitutional protection for zoning ordi-
nances.6  The Board held that zoning violations contained within
an application for a permit to operate a waste facility do not compel
an automatic denial of applications filed with the Pennsylvania De-
partment of Environmental Protection (DEP).7  In addition, the
Board’s decision created a new obligation for individuals or entities
that desire to apply for certain permits within the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth).8  Moreover, the Board has yet to
1. Tri-Cty. Landfill, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Dep’t of Envtl.
Prot. and Pine Twp. and Grove City Factory Shops LP, Intervenors, No. 2013-185-L,
2015 WL 3486003 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. May 22, 2016).
2. See id. at *1 (noting procedural posture of case).
3. For a further discussion of the environmental protections offered under
the Pennsylvania Constitution, see infra note 25 and accompanying text.
4. For a further discussion of the Board’s determination of obligations arising
under its decision, see infra note 112 and accompanying text.
5. See Tri-Cty. Landfill, Inc., 2015 WL 3486003, at *2-4 (holding zoning laws
within ambit of Section 27 and outlining logic used to reach conclusion).
6. For a further discussion of the impact on permit applicants, see infra note
172 and accompanying text.
7. For a further discussion of the decision not to compel automatic denial of a
permit application that includes a zoning violation, see infra note 115 and accom-
panying text.
8. For a further discussion of the new requirement placed on permit appli-
cants, see infra note 172 and accompanying text.
(305)
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analyze the question of how the DEP would be alerted to any zon-
ing violations within an applicant’s proposed plan.9
This Casenote begins with a discussion of the facts relevant to
the Board’s decision in Tri-County Landfill, Inc. as well as an over-
view of the dispute between the parties involved in the case.10
Then, this Note provides insight into the Payne test, which the
Board relied heavily on when making its decision.11  Following that
discussion, this Note details the Board’s decision regarding what
obligations arose as a result of its holding.12
Subsequent to that analysis, this Note provides a critical per-
spective on what appears to be a decision that does not overstep any
boundaries.13  Consequently, this Note details the Board’s reliance
on the plain language of statutes in its decision, which lends itself to
a view that the decision did not impermissibly cross any lines.14  The
analysis also highlights the Board’s reservations regarding the impo-
sition of a new obligation on the DEP.15  Subsequently, this Note
also highlights the Board’s failure to discuss an already-existing ob-
ligation imposed on permit applicants.16
Finally, this Note concludes with an overview of potential im-
pacts of the Board’s decision;17 one such impact includes the
ramifications on citizens’ rights to bring a claim under Section 27.18
This Note also discusses the open question of who bears the respon-
sibility of bringing zoning violations within permit applications to
9. For a further discussion of the questions regarding the responsibility to
report zoning violations to the DEP, see infra note 173 and accompanying text.
10. For a further discussion of the parties’ arguments related to zoning and
Section 27, see infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
11. For a further discussion of the Payne analysis, see infra note 58 and accom-
panying text.
12. For a further discussion of the Board’s holding on obligations that arise
under its holding, see infra note 113 and accompanying text.
13. For a further discussion of the limited scope of the Board’s decision, see
infra note 129 and accompanying text.
14. For a further discussion of the Board’s reliance on the plain language of
the statutes, see infra note 160 and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of the Board’s hesitance to impose an obligation
on the DEP to seek out zoning violations, see infra note 115 and accompanying
text.
16. For a further discussion of the Board’s choice not to discuss the require-
ment of an affirmative demonstration of compliance, see infra note 147 and ac-
companying text.
17. For a further discussion of the Board’s holding, see infra notes 109, 113,
115 and accompanying text.
18. For a further discussion of the impact of the Board’s decision on citizens’
standing under Section 27, see infra note 168 and accompanying text.
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the attention of the DEP.19 Consequently, it also highlights the cre-
ation of a new obligation in the permit approval process.20  This
Note then illustrates potential opportunities for unethical behavior
on the part of zoning boards.21  In concluding with its discussion of
the potential impact on community development on XYZ, this Note
also considers prospective positive results from the decision.22
II. FACTS
In Tri-County Landfill, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pa., the Board
ruled on Pine Township, Grove City Factory Shops LP and several
citizens’ (Intervenors) motion for summary judgment, which the
DEP later joined.23  The motion focused on Tri-County Landfill,
Inc.’s (Tri-County) application to operate a landfill, which the DEP
previously denied.24  A primary issue in this case was whether Sec-
tion 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution compelled the DEP to au-
tomatically deny Tri-County’s permit.25
In 2004, Tri-County applied for “a permit to reopen and ex-
pand its landfill.”26  The landfill, which originally opened in the
1970s, managed and expanded operations for numerous years with-
out permission from the Pine Township Zoning Board.27  When the
landfill reopened, the larger design encompassed approximately
ninety-nine acres, which constituted half of which was in Pine
Township.28  Tri-County’s application required description of the
landfill it wished to operate and an expected height of 140 feet.29
19. For a further discussion of who bears the responsibility of reporting zon-
ing violations to the DEP, see infra note 165 and accompanying text.
20. For a further discussion of the new obligation arising in the permit appli-
cation process, see infra note 172 and accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion of the potential for unethical behavior by zoning
boards, see infra note 175 and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion of potential positive outcomes following the
Board’s decision, see infra note 179 and accompanying text.
23. See Tri-Cty. Landfill, Inc., 2015 WL 3486003, at *1 (summarizing parties’
arguments on summary judgment issue).
24. See id. (summarizing procedural posture of case).
25. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (establishing Commonwealth’s constitutional
obligation to act as trustee of natural and environmental resources for citizens).
26. Tri-Cty. Landfill Inc., 2015 WL 3486003, at *1 (outlining timeline of events
leading to permit and subsequent denial).
27. Tri-Cty. Landfill, Inc. v. Pine Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 83 A.3d 488, 495
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014) (highlighting lack of zoning approvals for earlier expan-
sions), appeal denied, 627 Pa. 776, 101 A.3d 788 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014).
28. Id. at 493 (noting size and geographical location of landfill and planned
expansion).
29. Tri-Cty. Landfill Inc., 2015 WL 3486003, at *1 (highlighting desired height
of landfill).
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The height, however, directly violated Pine Township’s local zoning
ordinance and limited the maximum height for structures within
the municipality to forty feet.30
In an effort to gain approval for the plan, Tri-County made
numerous cases to the Pine Township zoning board to no avail.31
Eventually, Tri-County brought an action in the Union County
Court of Common Pleas challenging the zoning board’s denials.32
Tri-County requested relief, including overturning the zoning
board’s denial of assorted variances, nonconforming use permits,
and equitable variances.33  The trial court, however, largely upheld
the Pine Township Zoning Board’s decisions.34
Upon the trial court’s decision, Tri-County appealed its case
before the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.35  The Common-
wealth Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the trial court’s decision and
denied Tri-County’s appeals.36  Aside from overcoming zoning is-
sues, Tri-County also needed to obtain a permit from the DEP to
operate the facility.37  Tri-County applied for the permit, which in-
cluded a proposed landfill height of 140 feet.38  The DEP denied
the permit request; the factors compelling denial included the vio-
30. Id. (defining ordinance’s municipal limit on height of structures).
31. Pine Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 83 A.3d at 493 (noting Tri-County made
many attempts using various legal theories to gain zoning approval).  Tri-County
made a number of arguments, including the definition of “structures” within the
zoning ordinance does not include landfills; that Tri-County never abandoned its
nonconforming use from its earlier operation of the landfill; that Pine Township’s
zoning, as codified, creates a ban on landfills within the municipality; and various
equitable theories. Id. at 500-04.
32. Id. at 503 (stating legal action Tri-County took after Zoning Hearing
Board denied appeal).
33. Id. (listing holdings of trial court that Tri-County challenged in Penn-
sylvania Commonwealth Court).
34. See id. (noting affirmation of zoning board decision by trial court, despite
disagreement over aspect of zoning board’s ruling).  The trial court disagreed with
the zoning board’s determination that Tri-County abandoned its non-conforming
use by closing the landfill. Id.
35. See id. at 493 (outlining procedural posture and issues presented to
court).
36. See Pine Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 83 A.3d at 495 (establishing holding of
court).  Tri-County appealed the decision and was denied. See Tri-Cty. Landfill,
Inc. v. Pine Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 101 A.3d 788 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014) (deny-
ing appeal).
37. For a discussion of the requirement stipulating that entities operating a
landfill need a permit see infra note 45 and accompanying text.
38. See Tri-Cty. Landfill, Inc. v. Pa., Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. and Pine Twp. &
Grove City Factory Shops LP, Intervenors, No. 2013-185-L, 2015 WL 3486003, at *1
(Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. May 22, 2016) (noting Tri-County included proposed
height in application for DEP permit).
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lation of local zoning laws and a history of entities associated with
Tri-County that continually engaged in noncompliance.39
Tri-County appealed the decision and brought the case before
the Board.40  On appeal, several citizens, Pine Township, and Grove
City Factory Shops LP intervened and moved for summary judg-
ment; they argued that Section 27 compelled an automatic denial
since Tri-County’s plan violated local zoning ordinances.41  The
DEP later joined in the motion for summary judgment and agreed
with the Intervenors that not issuing the permit was the correct de-
cision; the parties, however, disagreed as to whether a denial was
constitutionally mandated.42  Tri-County agreed with the DEP in ar-
guing that no such obligation existed.43  After considering the mer-
its of both arguments, the Board dismissed the motion, holding
that the decision to deny the permit hinged on the discretion of the
DEP and analysis of such discretion was inappropriate for summary
judgment.44
III. BACKGROUND
In the Commonwealth, an entity that desires to operate a mu-
nicipal waste facility or landfill must obtain a permit through the
DEP.45 The application for a permit must contain a wide array of
information, including members and associates of the entity apply-
ing for the permit, as well as those parties’ previous violations of
law.46  The issuance or denial of a permit depends on the applicant
“affirmatively demonstrating” compliance with both statutory law
and the Pennsylvania Constitution.47
39. See id. (outlining DEP’s rationale for denying permit application).
40. Id. (stating procedural posture of case before Board).
41. Tri-County Landfill Inc., 2015 WL 3486003, at *1 (identifying intervening
parties and outlining basic crux of legal argument); see generally ULI Development
Case Studies, URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, available at http://casestudies.uli.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/sites/98/2015/12/C028013.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2016) (provid-
ing background information on Grove City Factory Shops, including location in
relation to Pine Township).
42. Tri-County Landfill Inc., 2015 WL 3486003, at *2 (noting parties’ differing
views on what obligations arise under Pennsylvania Constitution).
43. Id. (detailing parties’ opposing arguments).
44. Id. at *6-7 (denying request for summary judgment because, as matter of
law, denying permit without opportunity to modify was not abuse of discretion).
45. See 25 PA. CODE § 271.101 (2016) (stating requirement for permit to oper-
ate facility).
46. See id. § 271.124-25 (mandating all parties associated with entity applying
for application must state identities along with violations of law).
47. Id. at § 271.201 (listing requirements for permit approval).  For a further
discussion of Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, see supra note
25 and the accompanying text.
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More specifically, the Pennsylvania Constitution places a duty
on the state to act as a trustee of public resources and to preserve
them for citizens of the Commonwealth.48  As noted in the Com-
monwealth Court of Pennsylvania’s holding in White v. Twp. of Upper
St. Clair,49 citizens have standing to bring a claim under Section 27
if they have “substantial, direct, and immediate” interest in the mat-
ter within the ambit of the section.50  In White, township residents
brought a claim challenging the validity of local government ac-
tions relating to deed enforcement on a property on which a com-
munications tower was constructed.51  The court held that the
residents, as taxpayers and part of the public, had standing and
their interests were squarely within the scope of Section 27.52
After establishing standing, a claimant must show that a gov-
ernmental action violated one of the rules of the test established in
Payne v. Kassab.53  In Payne, a group of citizens brought a class ac-
tion suit opposing the Pennsylvania Department of Transporta-
tion’s approval of a street-widening project.54  The citizens
contended that Section 27 should be read strictly and bring maxi-
mum protection to natural resources.55  Citing concerns with the
applicability of this interpretation, the court declined to apply it.56
In doing so, the court established a three-part test to determine the
lawfulness of an action under Section 27.57  The test asks:
(1) Was there compliance with all applicable statutes and
regulations relevant to the protection of the Common-
48. PA. CONST. art I, § 27 (establishing environmental protections).
49. 799 A.2d 188, 197 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) (citing William Penn Parking
Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 346 A.2d 269, 286 (Pa. 1975)) (noting test for
standing).
50. Id. (outlining requirements for standing under section).
51. Id. at 192 (listing issues to be decided by court, including whether re-
sidents have standing).
52. See id. at 197 (noting resident’s concerns of conservation, recreation, and
historical purpose are protected by Pennsylvania Constitution).
53. 312 A.2d 86 (Pa. Commw. 1973), aff’d, 323 A.2d 407 (Pa. Commw. 1974),
aff’d, 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976) (establishing test for validity of board action within
Commonwealth).
54. Id. at 92 (noting city council’s recommendation for plan and Department
of Transportation’s subsequent approval of modification included in revised plan).
55. See id. at 94 (stating constitutional obligation and citizens’ desired
interpretation).
56. See id. (interpreting Section 27 to allow for normal development of land
within Commonwealth).  The court also explained that Section 27 creates a “pub-
lic trust concept,” through which the government manages resources within the
Commonwealth, balancing development and citizen concerns with how the land
will be utilized in proposed plans. Id.
57. Id. (identifying test used to determine validity of action).
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wealth’s public natural resources?  (2) Does the record
demonstrate a reasonable effort to reduce the environ-
mental incursion to a minimum?  (3) Does the environ-
mental harm which will result from the challenged
decision or action so clearly outweigh the benefits to be
derived therefrom that to proceed further would be an
abuse of discretion?58
After reviewing the arguments made under those parameters,
the court found that the Department of Transportation complied
with the requirements and dismissed the case.59
Municipalities are also instrumental in the preservation of envi-
ronmental resources within the Commonwealth through the enact-
ment of zoning laws.60  The establishment of zoning laws is among
the many purposes listed for Pennsylvania Municipal Planning
Code (MPC).61  Communities enact land use and zoning ordi-
nances to assure that land usage is consistent with citizens’ values
and needs.62  Moreover, local government’s power to enact zoning
receives consideration when the DEP reviews an application to op-
erate a facility, such as a landfill, thanks to two statutory provisions,
commonly referred to as Acts 67 and 68.63
That notion received formal recognition from the courts in
Hoffman Min. Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Adams Twp., Cambria
Cty.,64 in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that mu-
nicipalities possessed the authority to “enact, amend, and repeal
zoning ordinances to implement comprehensive plans and to ac-
58. Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. 1973) (listing three steps
used to determine validity of action taken by DEP or other agency).
59. See id. at 94-96 (detailing Department of Transportation’s compliance
with each step of test).
60. See 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10105 (West 2016) (listing zoning
as purpose of Municipal Planning Code).
61. Id. (highlighting purposes of Municipal Planning Code, including estab-
lishing zoning to further community objectives).
62. See id. § 10603(a) (noting factors that should be considered when drafting
zoning ordinances).
63. See id. § 10619.2(a) (declaring that Commonwealth agencies, such as
DEP, “shall consider and may rely [upon] . . . zoning ordinances” during permit
review process). Id. § 11105 (establishing legal effect of municipalities adopting
comprehensive plan, including zoning ordinances and laws).  These statutory pro-
visions, commonly referred to as Acts 67 and 68, respectively, outline the legal
ramifications of municipal planning and its interplay with the DEP permit process.
See Tri-Cty. Landfill Inc., 2015 WL 3486003, at *3 (noting that statutes are often
called Acts 67 and 68).
64. 32 A.3d 587 (Pa. 2011).
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complish any of the purposes of the MPC.”65  One of the issues in
Hoffman stemmed from a mining company seeking either a vari-
ance permit or the nullification of a zoning ordinance that prohib-
ited mining within one thousand feet of structures.66  The court,
citing both the language and purposes of the MPC, upheld the ac-
tion and recognized the notion of local land use ordinances work-
ing in tandem with state laws.67
Courts also recognized the unique scope of zoning laws, as
compared to the scope of typical state statutes.68  Notably, in Hunt-
ley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough Council of Borough of Oakmont (Huntley
& Huntley, Inc.),69 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that
zoning laws are both “broader and narrower in scope” than state
statutes.70  The court reasoned that the narrowness stems from the
limited scope of zoning laws, given that zoning laws govern only the
particular municipality where enacted, whereas state statutes gov-
ern the whole Commonwealth.71  The broad aspect of zoning laws
expresses itself in the wide range of subject matter that zoning and
land use ordinances can encompass.72  When closely analyzing the
MPC, it is clear that one of the specific purposes of zoning is the
preservation of “the natural, scenic[,] and historic values in the en-
vironment.”73  Despite that statutory purpose, in Blue Mountain Pres-
ervation Association v. City of Eldred (Blue Mountain),74 the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania declined to interpret Sec-
tion 27 as imposing an affirmative obligation on zoning boards to
enact policies that protect environmental resources.75
65. Hoffman Min. Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Adams Twp., Cambria Cty.,
32 A.3d 587, 603 (Pa. 2011) (outlining authority of zoning boards to carry out
various actions related to zoning ordinances).
66. See id. at 590–91 (outlining coal company’s petitions and relief sought).
67. See id. at 603-04 (supporting decision by noting purposes of MPC and lan-
guage within Surface Mining Act that augments land use planning ordinances).
68. For a further discussion of the scope of zoning laws, see infra notes 70 and
71 and accompanying text.
69. 964 A.2d 855 (Pa. 2009).
70. See id. at 865 (contrasting reach of local ordinances and state laws).
71. Id. (illustrating differences in scope of local zoning laws and state laws).
72. See id. (explaining that zoning laws embody “overall statement of commu-
nity development objectives”).
73. 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10604 (West 2016) (discussing pur-
poses of zoning).  This section lists the established purposes of zoning; among
them is the preservation of natural and environmental resources. Id.
74. 867 A.2d 692 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005).
75. Blue Mountain Pres. Ass’n v. City of Eldred, 867 A.2d 692, 703 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2005) (declaring that zoning boards have no obligation to enact pro-
tective ordinances).
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In Blue Mountain, a citizens group brought a civil action against
the city’s zoning board after the board approved plans for a high
performance car facility on land near the Appalachian Trail.76  The
citizens argued that the board had a duty under Section 27 to enact
zoning policies to protect the environment of the trail and sur-
rounding area.77  The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, how-
ever, found that Section 27 imposed no such duty on local
municipalities and zoning boards.78  Although it held that no af-
firmative obligation existed under Section 27 to enact zoning or
land use ordinances, the court found that the board must review
law applicable to the specific plan at hand.79  After finding that the
board appropriately considered the applicable law, the court noted
that the board’s approval complied with the Payne analysis and that
the board enacted a number of measures designed to mitigate the
noise produced by the facility.80
Despite the lack of a constitutional obligation under Section 27
to enact land use ordinances or zoning laws, commenters urged lo-
cal government bodies to take action when their municipalities
faced high risks created by inconsistent land usage.81  For example,
a chemical facility explosion in West, Texas could have been ex-
tremely deadly if a nearby school was in session.82  Commenters
urged zoning boards to enact measures that prevent schools from
being built in close proximity to chemical facilities that could be
hazardous to both human and environmental health in the event of
an emergency.83
76. See id. at 695 (detailing specific plans for development and citizen groups’
concerns).
77. See id. at 701 (outlining citizens’ argument that board violated Penn-
sylvania Constitution by not enacting land use regulations to mitigate sounds from
planned facility).
78. See id. at 702 (determining that court would not create obligation).
79. See Blue Mountain Pres. Ass’n, 867 A.2d at 703–04 (holding no affirmative
obligation to enact land use legislation existed and board needed to consider Nat-
ural Trail Act).
80. See id. at 704 (detailing and listing restrictions board imposed to reduce
noise output of facility).
81. See “West Explosion Shows Need for State, Local Zoning: Study,” Chem.
Reg. Rep. (BNA) 40 CRR 915 (Issue No. 32, 08/08/16) (urging action by zoning
boards to mitigate risk of schools facing potential for disasters due to close proxim-
ity to chemical facilities).
82. See id. (referencing study predicting that, if explosion occurred during
daytime, ten to forty percent of people in two closest schools would have died).
83. See id. (noting high number of schools within one-half of mile of type of
facility in which West explosion occurred).
9
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Once a municipality establishes a zoning ordinance, the ordi-
nance can allow for conditional uses within zones.84  Conditional
permits grant “a zoning change which is subject to specific condi-
tions either bilaterally or unilaterally agreed upon by the zoning
authorities and applicant [after negotiations between the parties]
which limit otherwise permitted uses in the zone district.”85  Some
jurisdictions do not allow conditional permits due to concerns re-
garding impropriety by zoning boards; conditional use permits,
however, are valid in Pennsylvania.86  As demonstrated in Clinton
County Solid Waste Authority v. Wayne Township (Clinton County),87
municipalities in Pennsylvania can issue conditional use permits
which allow for land usage that would otherwise be noncompliant
with zoning ordinances in exchange for compliance with various
conditions imposed by the zoning board.88  In Clinton County, the
court affirmed the authority of the zoning board to enact condi-
tions on a landfill as long as the conditions did not fall within the
governance of applicable laws.89
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
The Board faced a decision that turned on two key questions:
1) whether zoning laws were within the ambit of Section 27; and 2)
if so, whether a violation of municipal zoning laws compels a
mandatory denial of a permit to operate a landfill within the munic-
ipality.90  The Intervenors argued that both of those questions
should be answered in the affirmative.91  Tri-County conceded that
the plan outlined in its application required revisions to comply
with local zoning ordinances, but maintained that the DEP should
84. See 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10603 (West 2016) (providing
that zoning ordinance can allow conditional uses within zoning scheme).
85. JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 16:13 (updated Oct. 2016)
(describing what conditional permits entail).
86. See id. (noting general concerns regarding propriety of zoning boards due
to extrinsic forces).
87. 643 A.2d 1162 (Pa. Commw. 1994).
88. Clinton Cty. Solid Waste Authority v. Wayne Twp., 643 A.2d 1162, 1168
(Pa. Commw. 1994) (establishing that town, residual to its police power under
MPC, can issue conditional use permits provided for in zoning ordinance as long
as applicable laws are observed).
89. See id. at 1169 (listing conditions imposed on landfill).
90. See Tri-Cty. Landfill Inc. v. Pa. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 2015 WL 3486003, at
*2, *5 (stating two main issues confronting Board).  Between these two issues, the
Board also established the obligations of the DEP when a violation of local zoning
is brought to its attention. Id. at *4.
91. See id. at *1 (summarizing position upon which Intervenors based motion
for summary judgment).
10
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have nonetheless issued a conditional permit.92  The DEP and In-
tervenors agreed that not issuing the permit was the correct deci-
sion; the parties, however, disagreed as to whether a denial was
constitutionally mandated.93
The primary point of contention between the DEP and Inter-
venors hinges on the role of local zoning ordinances in the permit
review process.94  The parties specifically disagreed over whether
zoning is considered within the scope of the Payne test.95  Courts
utilize the test to determine the validity of DEP action under Sec-
tion 27.96  The DEP, along with Tri-County, argued that local zon-
ing ordinances need to be considered in the review process, but a
plan that violates a local zoning ordinance does not require an au-
tomatic permit denial.97  In contrast, the Intervenors posited that, if
the DEP approved a plan that it knew violated local zoning laws,
then the DEP would breach its duty under Section 27.98
The Board began its process of answering that question with an
analysis of the Payne test.99  The Board placed emphasis on the first
prong of the test, noting that both Tri-County’s and the DEP’s argu-
ment interpreted the test in a limited manner.100  Rather than a
restrictive interpretation, the Board pointed out that case law indi-
cated that the Payne test includes “all applicable statutes and regula-
tions,” not just federal and state laws.101  With that in mind, the
92. See id. (detailing Tri-County’s assertion that permit would need substantial
modifications but did not require automatic denial).
93. See id. at *2 (noting parties’ differing views on what obligations arise
under Pennsylvania Constitution).
94. See id. (summarizing parties’ arguments on impact of zoning violations on
permit application process).
95. See Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. 1973) (stating standard
that is applied in assessing Department action under Article I, Section 27 of Penn-
sylvania Constitution), aff’d, 323 A.2d 407 (Pa. Commw. 1974), aff’d, 361 A.2d 263
(Pa. Commw. 1976).  In the case at hand, only the first prong of the test is at issue.
Id.  The first prong of the test asks: “Was there compliance with all applicable stat-
utes and regulations relevant to the protection of the Commonwealth’s public nat-
ural resources?” Id.
96. See Tri-Cty. Landfill Inc., 2015 WL 3486003, at *2 (noting that Environmen-
tal Hearing Board recently affirmed use of test in prior case).
97. Id. (outlining argument proffered by DEP and Tri-County pertaining to
impact of zoning violations within plan).
98. Id. (noting Intervenor’s contrasting regarding effect of zoning violation in
permit review process).
99. See id. (commencing analysis of DEP’s action relating to permit approval).
100. See id. (explaining scope of test as defined by courts in contrast with
scope argued by Tri-County and DEP).
101. Tri-Cty. Landfill Inc., 2015 WL 3486003, at *2 (establishing what regula-
tions courts have defined test to encompass).
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Board then looked to whether local zoning laws maintained rele-
vance to the protection of natural resources.102
In determining whether local zoning ordinances served to pro-
tect the environment, the Board began its analysis by reviewing the
purposes of the MPC.103  The Board noted that the MPC listed envi-
ronmental preservation as one of its purposes and related that to
the holding of Huntley & Huntley, Inc., which held that state regula-
tions do not preempt local regulations.104  Keeping that connection
in mind, the Board found that local zoning regulations satisfied the
requirements for consideration under the Payne analysis.105
Tri-County and the DEP attempted to neutralize that finding
with an argument focused on Acts 67 and 68.106  The parties pos-
ited that, despite a statutory provision suggesting that the DEP may
consider local decisions, the DEP retained a liberty to disregard
them if it so desired.107  The Board, however, found that argument
untenable in light of the designed purpose of Acts 67 and 68.108
On those grounds, the Board held that local zoning require-
ments were within the protections offered by Section 27 and, there-
fore, merited consideration in the Payne test.109  The Board
considered the purposes of municipal zoning ordinances as stated
in statutes, as well as case law explaining those provisions.110  In
102. Id. (posing question of whether zoning laws fall into appropriate cate-
gory for consideration in constitutionality of actions).
103. See id. (beginning judicial analysis with review of purposes of statute).
104. See id. at *3 (detailing purpose of statute and relationship between local
ordinances and state statutes and regulations).  For a further discussion of Huntley
& Huntley, Inc., see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
105. Tri-Cty. Landfill Inc., 2015 WL 3486003, at *3 (declaring that local zoning
ordinances serve to protect environment).
106. See id. (urging Board to adopt suggested interpretation which would
limit obligation).
107. Id. (suggesting that DEP has option of disregarding local decisions in
permit review process).
108. See id. at *4 (finding restrictive application of Acts 67 and 68 illogical
based on purpose of Acts).  For a further discussion of Acts 67 and 68, see supra
note 63 and accompanying text.  The Board did not explicitly answer the DEP and
Tri-County’s assertions regarding Acts 67 and 68; rather, it declared that “the De-
partment clearly had the authority and indeed the obligation to honor zoning
requirements under Article I, Section 27.” Id.
109. See id. (explaining that local ordinances, in addition to state statutes, fall
within scope of test).
110. See Tri-Cty. Landfill Inc., 2015 WL 3486003, at *2, *4 (noting illogical na-
ture of arguments posed by Tri-County and DEP, and characterizing need to look
at local ordinances as “obligation” of DEP).  The Board found it notable that Tri-
County and the DEP posed an argument that would result in allowing the DEP to
issue a permit in the face of an overt local zoning requirement violation. Id.  The
Board found it especially unpersuasive in light of the pertinent law, which indi-
cated a desire to emphasize the autonomy of local zoning regulations. Id.
12
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short, the Board found the argument incompatible with the stated
purposes of municipal zoning regulations.111
Next, the Board shifted its focus toward determining what obli-
gations the DEP has when a zoning violation is brought to the De-
partment’s attention during the permit review process.112  In
answering that inquiry, the Board held that the DEP must consider
a zoning violation when making its final decision if the violation is
brought to the DEP’s attention during the permit review process.113
After considering the violation, the Department will issue an appro-
priate decision in light of the circumstances.114
The Board further held that even when a permit application
contains local zoning violations, the appropriate decision is not al-
ways to deny the permit.115  The Board declared that rather than
denying a permit application that violates zoning regulations, the
DEP could either suspend the permit review process or issue a con-
ditional permit.116  Thus, the Board did not agree that the violation
of zoning requirements compelled an automatic denial of Tri-
County’s permit, despite finding that zoning fell within the parame-
ters of the Payne test.117  The Board agreed with the DEP’s decision
to not issue a permit in this particular case.118  Tri-County, however,
111. See id. at *2 (highlighting purposes of local zoning and land use ordi-
nances as defined in Municipal Planning Code).
112. See id. at *4 (proceeding with analysis by seeking to determine what obli-
gations arise when zoning violation is brought to attention of Board during permit
review process).
113. Id. at *4 (describing resulting impact of Board’s holding on DEP’s per-
mit consideration process).  The Board noted that the DEP has no enforcement or
investigative duties when zoning issues are brought to its attention during permit
review process. Id.
114. See id. at *5 (explaining that, based on circumstances, Board can decide
whether it is appropriate to grant permit outright, grant conditional permit, or
suspend review process).
115. Tri-Cty. Landfill Inc., 2015 WL 3486003, at *5 (holding that, despite par-
ties’ argument that violation of local zoning compels automatic denial, viable alter-
natives to denial exist and can be employed).
116. See id. (noting that decision between alternatives involves consideration
of various factors, including degree of conflict between plan and local
ordinances).
117. See id. at *6 (remaining mindful of Tri-County’s proposed alternative of
granting conditional permit).
118. See id. at *5 (holding that not issuing permit was correct decision).  The
Board noted that Tri-County’s plan plainly violated local zoning ordinances to
such an extent that issuing a conditional permit would make little sense because
the original plan would require alterations to an extent that it would not be a
modification of the original plan; rather, it would amount to an entirely new plan.
Id.  Accordingly, no zoning question or issue remained open for debate or left
unanswered. Id.
13
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maintained that the DEP abused its discretion by not issuing some
variety of permit.119
The Board concluded that reviewing the discretion of the DEP
was not an appropriate area for summary judgment.120  Tri-
County’s and the DEP’s last argument maintained that the zoning
issues should be assessed separately from the history of compliance
issues of entities associated with Tri-County and jointly requested a
bifurcation of the issues.121  The Board, however, denied the par-
ties’ request for bifurcation as to the zoning issue because the
Board felt that the zoning issue and the compliance issues needed
to be assessed in tandem to give the DEP and Board the most com-
prehensive set of facts upon which to make a determination.122  On
those grounds, the Board denied the motion for summary
judgment.123
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
In Tri-County Landfill Inc., the Board reached a sensible deci-
sion based on previous case law the plain language of applicable
statutes.124  The Intervenors, as citizens possessing standing under
the holding in White, advocated for a strong decision that would
effectively terminate any permit application that violated local zon-
ing.125  The Board began its analysis by determining that zoning
regulations fell within the scope of environmental protections of-
fered in Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Payne
test based on the language of applicable statutes.126  The Board
clearly established that a purpose of land use planning statutes is
119. Id. at *6 (highlighting Tri-County’s argument that DEP has issued condi-
tional permits frequently, and doing so would be appropriate in present case).
The parties also argued over whether the Board abused its discretion by not issuing
the permit without Tri-County a chance to modify it. Id.  The Board went on to
note that encouraging Tri-County to modify its permit might be an abuse of discre-
tion if it knew that it would deny the request based on compliance history. Id.
120. Tri-Cty. Landfill Inc., 2015 WL 3486003, at *6-7 (establishing that reviews
of DEP discretion not appropriate subject matter for summary judgment).
121. Id. (illustrating parties’ desire to bifurcate proceedings to focus on zon-
ing issues).  All parties requested that the zoning issue and compliance issue be
bifurcated, and that the Board focus on the zoning issue. Id. at *1.
122. Id. (finding that history of compliance issues with Tri-County’s associates
and zoning issue cannot be bifurcated).
123. Id. (denying motion for summary judgment).
124. See id. at *3 (citing to plain language of statute).
125. For a further discussion of standing under Section 27, see supra note 50
and accompanying text.
126. Tri-Cty. Landfill Inc., 2015 WL 3486003, at *2 (starting analysis with re-
view purposes of land use and zoning ordinances).
14
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safeguarding natural resources.127  The Board further noted that
zoning, a closely related field also within the ambit of the MPC,
served a similar purpose.128  By clearly emphasizing the statutory
language, the Board established a posture that it was relying on set-
tled principals rather than overreaching its discretion.129
The Board then applied Huntley & Huntley, Inc. to remove any
ambiguity as to the roles of state laws and local ordinances in rela-
tion to safeguarding environmental assets and natural resources.130
Comparing and contrasting state and local regulations allowed the
Board to clearly demonstrate that it did not seek to disturb the
reach of either area.131  This restrained approach enabled the
Board to address the parties’ arguments under Acts 67 and 68.132
Having outlined the purposes of zoning, the Board then issued a
clear statement of the authority that the Acts granted.133  Establish-
ing this analysis provided strong grounds upon which to reject the
DEP’s and Tri-County’s argument for restrictive application of Acts
67 and 68.134  On those grounds, the Board found that zoning laws
were unequivocally within the scope of Section 27, and that deci-
sion served as the foundation for the subsequent analysis.135  By
reaching that conclusion, the Board did not extend the scope of
Section 27; rather, it properly clarified that local zoning regulations
fell within its ambit.136
Having determined that Section 27 contemplated zoning, the
Board next resolved what DEP obligations arose under Section
27.137  Primarily relying on its past decisions, the Board did not cre-
127. Id. at *1 (stating purpose of land use regulations).  For a further discus-
sion of the MPC and planning, see supra note 62 and accompanying text.
128. Id. (explaining zoning has purpose similar to that of land use planning).
129. See id. at *2 (citing to statutory language).
130. Id. at *3 (discussing “complimentary” role of state and local laws).  For a
further discussion of Huntley & Huntley, Inc., see supra note 70 and accompanying
text.
131. See Tri-Cty. Landfill Inc., 2015 WL 3486003, at *3 (using illustration involv-
ing landfill to distinguish two types of law).
132. See id. (using emphasis to establish statutory purpose drafted by
legislature).
133. For a further discussion of Acts 67 and 68, see supra note 63 and accom-
panying text.
134. See Tri-Cty. Landfill Inc., 2015 WL 3486003, at *3 (rejecting restrictive in-
terpretation after reviewing purposes defined within statute).
135. Id. at *4 (declaring parties’ disagreements over scope of Acts 67 and 68
nonessential because acts clearly establish DEP’s “obligation to honor zoning
requirements”).
136. See id. at *2, *4 (holding that statutory language indicated that all regula-
tions were to be considered and DEP had obligation to consider them).
137. Id. at *4 (stating need to determine DEP obligation under Section 27).
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ate an obligation for the DEP to independently seek out any zoning
issues.138  The Board’s refusal to create a new affirmative obligation
was seemingly consistent with the holding of the court in Blue
Mountain.139  Although Blue Mountain spoke to obligations of zon-
ing boards and not the DEP, the reviewing bodies exhibited similar
thinking in their hesitancy to impose newfound duties related to
zoning on other entities.140  This ruling further maintained one of
Hoffman’s key tenets: namely, deference to local government in es-
tablishing and enforcing zoning.141  The Board did not explicitly
mention any purposes that the municipality sought to further with
the established height requirement.142  It implicitly acknowledged
those purposes later, however, when noting that Tri-County’s plan
clearly violated them.143  By only requiring that the DEP consider,
but not decide violations of zoning ordinances, the Board allowed
local zoning bodies to retain autonomy in governing by reporting
violations to the DEP during the permit review process.144
The Board then addressed the issue of whether a violation of
Section 27 should compel an automatic permit denial, or if the
DEP could issue an alternative disposition.145  One such alternative
is the issuance of conditional permits, which Clinton County de-
clared zoning boards had the authority to issue within zoning
schemes.146  The Board made an omission in its discussion of condi-
tional permits, however, as it failed to consider the requirement of
demonstrating affirmative compliance with Section 27 of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution, which includes zoning.147  Before making its
138. See id. (utilizing precedent to establish DEP’s role in zoning).
139. For a further discussion of Blue Mountain, see supra note 79 and accom-
panying text.
140. See Blue Mountain Pres. Ass’n v. Twp. of Eldred, 867 A.2d 692, 703 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2005) (holding no affirmative obligation exists).
141. See Hoffman Mining Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Adams Twp., Cambria
Cty., 32 A.3d 587, 603 (Pa. 2011) (establishing that municipalities have authority to
enact zoning to carry out purposes of MPC).
142. See Tri-Cty. Landfill Inc., 2015 WL 3486003, at *1 (highlighting height
requirement at issue).
143. See id. at *5 (noting plan’s clear noncompliance).
144. See id. (detailing obligation that arises when zoning issue is brought to
attention of DEP).
145. See id. (listing examples of alternatives to denial, including suspending
review which had previously been done in case).  For a further discussion of condi-
tional permits, see supra note 84 and accompanying text.
146. See Clinton Cty. Solid Waste Auth. v. Wayne Twp., 643 A.2d 1162, 1168
(Pa. Commw. 1994) (holding that municipalities have authority to issue condi-
tional permits).  For a further discussion of Clinton County, see supra note 88 and
accompanying text.
147. For a further discussion of the need to affirmatively demonstrate compli-
ance with laws and regulations, see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
16
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decision on the matter, the Board listed facts that it found condu-
cive to a decision to deny the permit.148  The Board appeared to
encourage the DEP to consider issuing a conditional permit, as evi-
denced by entertaining Tri-County’s suggestion that the Depart-
ment could have issued such a permit before the instant appeal.149
Despite considering Tri-County’s proposition, the Board found that
it was inappropriate given that its plan violated zoning “beyond dis-
pute.”150  By pointing out the circumstances that made denial ap-
propriate in this case, but stopping short of determining that an
obligation to deny exists every time zoning laws are violated within
the realm of Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Board
did not overreach its discretion in its decision.151
The Board then pivoted that discussion toward the subject of
summary judgment.152  Retaining focus on the availability of alter-
natives to dissolution, the Board framed the discussion in a way that
emphasized the difficulty of knowing DEP’s focus in its decision-
making.153  The Board interwove that theme into its brief discus-
sion of the request for bifurcation.154  Tri-County’s plea that the
Board bifurcate the process seemingly asked the court to allow the
DEP to ignore an aspect of its review process.155  The Board’s lack
of receptiveness appeared to indicate its thoughts on the role of
compliance history as an integral part of the process.156  The em-
phasis on the consideration of a multitude of facts, and de facto
encouragement of it by way of denying the request to bifurcate, dis-
played the Board’s desire for the DEP to carry out its review process
148. See Tri-Cty. Landfill Inc., 2015 WL 3486003, at *5 (detailing facts that ap-
pear indicative of obligation to deny permit, including failure to pass appropriate
test).
149. See id. at *6 (considering Tri-County’s suggestion of suspension of review
process which had been done in past).
150. Id. at *5 (explaining unique aspects of case).  In particular, considering
substantial alterations needed for Tri-County’s plan to comply with zoning, issuing
“conditional permit, quite simply, would make no sense.” Id.
151. See id. (noting unusual circumstances of case that made denial appropri-
ate choice).
152. See id. at *6 (noting analysis of obligations to decision regarding sum-
mary judgment).
153. See Tri-Cty. Landfill Inc., 2015 WL 3486003 at, *6 (speculating about num-
ber of factors that triggered denial).
154. See id. at *6 (noting that Board and DEP should consider all factors when
deciding which resolution is most appropriate).
155. For a further discussion of the requirement of inclusion of compliance
history of associated entities, see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
156. See Tri-Cty. Landfill Inc., 2015 WL 3486003, at *7 n.8 (alluding to Board’s
belief that compliance issues may demand denial).
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and to make an informed decision and achieve a desirable result.157
That outcome demonstrated deference to the established permit
process and further displayed the lack of overreaching in its
holding.158
In its decision, the Board did not need to extend a previous
holding to make zoning fit into the scheme of Section 27.159  By
using the plain language of the statute, the Board relied on a com-
mon sense interpretation to reach its conclusion.160  In doing so,
the Board respected the latitude of municipal zoning authorities to
make and enact laws to protect natural resources and the environ-
ment, as their decision afforded those regulations the appropriate
protection under Section 27.161  This action reflected the Board’s
proper reliance on the distinction between state laws and zoning
regulations established in Huntley & Huntley, Inc.162
VI. IMPACT
By declaring that zoning ordinances fall within the ambit of
Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Board made a rela-
tively broad holding that will impact permit applications within the
Commonwealth.163  In affording zoning laws consideration under
Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Board strength-
ened the established purposes of zoning by giving it clear protec-
tion under the Pennsylvania Constitution.164  The Board, however,
left unanswered the question of who had the responsibility to bring
to the DEP’s attention the conflicts between zoning and a proposed
plan in a permit application.165  It appears, based on this decision,
that different statutory provisions grant both municipal officials
157. See id. at *8 (emphasizing numerous facts that could impact DEP deci-
sion).  The Board noted that issues regarding zoning violations and compliance
history are both necessary to make an appropriate decision. Id.
158. For an overview of the requirements needed for permit approval, see
supra note 47 and accompanying text.
159. For a further discussion of the purpose of Section 27, see supra note 25
and accompanying text.
160. See Tri-Cty. Landfill Inc., 2015 WL 3486003, at *2-3 (citing plain language
of statute to establish decision).
161. For a further discussion of Section 27 protections, see supra note 25 and
accompanying text.
162. For a further discussion of comparison between local zoning and state
laws, see supra note 72 and accompanying text.
163. For a further discussion of the constitutional protection in Pennsylvania,
see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
164. For a further discussion of an environmental purpose of zoning, see
supra note 73 and accompanying text.
165. For a further discussion of zoning issues in a DEP permit approval pro-
cess, see supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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and citizens opportunities to alert the DEP of a zoning issue within
a permit application.166
The Board also preserved an avenue for citizens to pursue ac-
tion under Section 27.167  As long as citizens can establish that they
possess the requisite interests related to zoning, they have a poten-
tial recourse in the event that the DEP remains unaware of a zoning
issue.168  It remains to be seen whether the decision will result in
increased litigation on these grounds; it should be noted, however,
that citizens are cognizant of the impact of zoning on various
dimensions of community development.169
Furthermore, the Board’s decision creates a new obligation for
permit applicants under one of the Pennsylvania statutes that de-
tails application contents.170  The statute requires that the applicant
affirmatively demonstrate compliance with Section 27 of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution.171  By determining that zoning falls within
the ambit of Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Board
created an obligation for applicants to affirmatively demonstrate
compliance with zoning regulations.172  Because the Board de-
clined to impose an obligation on the DEP to seek out zoning is-
sues, it appears that the Board intended to leave that obligation
with the zoning board and concerned citizens.173  The required
meeting among the applicant, zoning board, and DEP may be an
appropriate time for the Board to raise issues that an applicant may
try to conceal within an application.174
166. See 25 PA. CODE § 271.141 (2016) (describing notice requirements when
permit application is submitted to DEP); see also 25 PA. CODE § 271.202 (noting
that municipal officials, including zoning officials, and DEP personnel are re-
quired to meet and discuss plan).
167. For a further discussion of standing under Section 27, see supra note 50
and accompanying text.
168. For a further discussion of the requirements necessary for citizens to
have standing for a Section 27 claim, see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
169. See generally Kenneth A. Stahl, Neighborhood Empowerment and the Future of
the City, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 939, 940 (2013) (describing citizens’ conflicting desires
for zoning).
170. For a further discussion of compliance requirements within an applica-
tion, see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
171. For a further discussion of the need to affirmatively demonstrate compli-
ance with the Pennsylvania Constitution, see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
172. For a further discussion of the need to affirmatively demonstrate compli-
ance with the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Board’s failure to consider this
requirement, see supra notes 47 and 147 and accompanying text.
173. For a further discussion of the decision to decline to impose an obliga-
tion on the DEP to investigate for potential zoning violations, see supra notes 112-
114 and accompanying text.
174. For a further discussion of the mandate for a meeting between the DEP
and the local zoning board, see supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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The Board’s decision also potentially creates an opportunity
for zoning boards to enforce a zoning violation in order to compel
a DEP decision that slows down a development process.175  Follow-
ing this decision, zoning boards remain free of liability, even if the
zoning decision is made in bad faith.176  Moreover, even if zoning
boards move along with the process and issue a conditional permit,
concerns exist regarding the propriety of zoning boards issuing that
type of permit.177  Despite the necessary uses of certain types of per-
mits, zoning boards retain latitude in their decision making process
to craft outcomes that can achieve covert objectives.178
Despite the opportunities for zoning boards to act unsavorily,
the Board’s decision could also facilitate necessary development.179
After the DEP is alerted to a zoning violation contained in a plan,
the ability to suspend review, rather than being required to deny a
noncompliant plan, may lead to positive results.180 Instead of forc-
ing the abandonment of a potentially positive project due to a per-
mit application denial, the DEP can issue a conditional permit or
suspend the review process.181
Allowing a review process to be suspended, rather than deny-
ing a permit and forcing the process to end, will likely save time
and resources of the DEP because it eliminates the potential for
denied application to resurface in the form of a new application
with revisions that demonstrate compliance.182  During the suspen-
sion, both the applicant and zoning board would be able to evalu-
ate the merit and substance of their positions and potentially work
out a compromise, such as a conditional permit with conditions
175. For a further discussion of potential outcomes when a zoning violation is
brought to the attention of the DEP, see supra note 114 and accompanying text.
176. See R.P. Davis, Annotation, Liability of municipality in damages for its refusal
to grant permit, license, or franchise, 37 A.L.R.2d 694 (1954) (establishing that zoning
boards cannot be liable in damages for bad faith permit denial).
177. For a further discussion of concerns related to conditional permits, see
supra note 86 and accompanying text.
178. See 3 JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 16:12 (updated Oct.
2016) (noting that special or conditional permits often facilitate development of
projects that are undesirable).
179. See id. (highlighting flexibility that different permit types provide in com-
munity development).
180. For a further discussion of the Board’s decision not to mandate auto-
matic denial for noncompliant plans, see supra notes 115-119 and accompanying
text.
181. For a further discussion of conditional permits, see supra note 85 and
accompanying text.
182. For a further discussion of the permit requirements necessary to ensure
compliance with the DEP, see supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
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that mitigate community concerns.183  These productive exchanges
and solutions could work to further the established purposes of
zoning, including balancing beneficial, but noncompliant plans,
and community wishes.184  This decision strengthens the role of lo-
cal zoning ordinances within the realm of environmental protec-
tion and the protection offered under Section 27 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution without forcing new obligations on the
DEP and minimally increasing requirements for applicants within
the Commonwealth.185
Christyan A. Telech*
183. For a further discussion of the nature of conditions attached to condi-
tional permits, see supra note 85 and accompanying text.
184. For a further discussion of the purposes of zoning, see supra note 73 and
accompanying text.
185. For a further discussion of the new obligation on permit applicants, see
supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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